Oscar Porter v. Administrator New Jersey State by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-12-2021 
Oscar Porter v. Administrator New Jersey State 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Oscar Porter v. Administrator New Jersey State" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 587. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/587 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-02796) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 28, 2021 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO, District 
Judge.* 
  






* The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.   
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
ROBRENO, District Judge. 
Oscar Porter appeals the denial by the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We will 
affirm the district court’s denial. 
I.  Background 
 
In June 2005, Porter was convicted of, inter alia, robbery, aggravated assault, and 
attempted murder. Specifically, Porter and two other men were alleged to have dragged 
the victims, David Veal and Rayfield Ashford, into an alley, robbed them, and shot them. 
Ashford died. Veal survived and identified Porter as the shooter.  
Porter contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate 
and present testimony from his girlfriend, Katrina Adams, that he was at home with her at 
the time of the crimes; and (2) failing to investigate and present testimony from Adams 
and another woman, Rashana Lundy, that Porter was friends with Ashford, the deceased 
victim, and that Ashford would have invoked that friendship had Porter threatened him 
with a gun. 
In January 2008, Porter filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) alleging 
in part ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and call the two 
witnesses. The PCR court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court ultimately reversed the denial and remanded the case for an 
evidentiary hearing on Porter’s claim that he was denied effective assistance because of 
counsel’s failure to investigate Adams and her alibi evidence. State v. Porter, 80 A.3d 
732, 735, 740-41 (N.J. 2013). In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, 
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although Porter had not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to an evidentiary 
hearing regarding Lundy’s testimony on the friendship between Porter and Ashford, on 
remand the PCR court could consider whether counsel was ineffective for this reason as 
well. Id. at 740. 
In June 2014, the PCR court held the evidentiary hearing but limited it to 
counsel’s failure to investigate Adams’s alibi evidence and prohibited Porter from calling 
Lundy. The PCR court again denied Porter’s petition. After the denial was affirmed, State 
v. Porter, No. A-0530-14T4, 2016 WL 4575702, *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 2, 
2016), Porter filed a Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. 
After the district court denied Porter’s petition in April 2020, Porter v. Johnson, No. 17-
2796, 2020 WL 2079267, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020), we granted a certificate of 
appealability on Porter’s claims that: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
when trial counsel failed to interview and call Adams and Lundy; and (2) the district 
court should have granted an evidentiary hearing to consider Lundy’s proffered 
testimony. Both parties agree that the last reasoned state court decision on the merits is 
the PCR court’s June 10, 2014 opinion.  
II. Discussion 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. When a district court bases its 
decision on the state court record without holding an evidentiary hearing, as is the case 
here, we apply a plenary standard of review. Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  
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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a 
petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court decision “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
A decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court 
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] 
cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). An application of clearly 
established law is “unreasonable” if the court identifies the correct governing rule but 
applies it to the facts of the case in a manner that is not merely erroneous, but 
“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409-10; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). In 
other words, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 
While our review of a district court’s decision is plenary, the AEDPA requires us 
to give considerable deference to the determinations of the state courts. Palmer v. 
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Porter claims that the PCR court applied the Supreme Court precedent of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in an objectively unreasonable manner 
when analyzing his claims of ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to investigate 
and call Adams and Lundy. Under Strickland, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance 
of counsel must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 466 U.S. at 687. 
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“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 
Second, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance caused prejudice. Id. “This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and “the court should recognize that 
counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689, 690. 
In light of the deference given to the state court under the AEDPA, as well as the 
deference given to trial counsel’s decisions under Strickland, our review is “doubly 
deferential.” Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6. 
Porter also claims that the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold 
an evidentiary hearing regarding Lundy’s testimony. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 
465, 473 (2007) (providing that whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is within the 




A. The PCR court did not unreasonably apply the performance prong of 
Strickland in determining that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for 
failing to present the alibi testimony 
 
Porter first argues that the PCR court unreasonably applied the performance prong 
of Strickland by concluding that trial counsel’s assistance was not ineffective even 
though he failed to investigate Adams’s alibi claim and call Adams as an alibi witness.1  
During the PCR court’s evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained his decision 
not to call Adams at trial, stating that: (1) he typically did not like to use relatives or close 
friends as alibi witnesses because they could be biased; (2) Adams was Porter’s 
paramour; (3) Adams was young; and (4) after speaking with Porter about what Adams 
remembered, he concluded that she did not have a good recollection of events. Trial 
counsel testified that “one of the worst things you can do as a defense attorney in a 
homicide case . . . is to put on a bad alibi witness.” App. 160. Counsel further testified 
that, instead, he believed it would be prudent to focus on cross-examining Veal on his 
identification of Porter.  
The PCR court concluded that counsel’s decision was tactical and sound trial 
strategy because Adams “was a paramour of Defendant and in his experience, this would 
 
1  Porter’s argument focuses on trial counsel’s failure to explore Adams’s 
alibi evidence, but he also briefly argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to investigate and call Lundy and Adams regarding the alleged friendship between 
Porter and Ashford. As discussed in Section II. B., infra, trial counsel did not prejudice 
Porter by failing to investigate or utilize the irrelevant and speculative evidence of the 
alleged friendship. Therefore, we need not discuss the decision to exclude the testimony 
of Lundy and Adams on this issue under the first Strickland prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 697 (providing that a court may address the performance and prejudice prongs in any 
order and need not address both prongs “if the defendant makes an insufficient showing 
on one”).  
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not be favorable for a defendant,” and that Porter had told him “she did not have a good 
recollection of what happened.” App. 85. The PCR court also concluded after hearing 
Adams’s testimony that she was incredible, and it did not believe she was with Porter on 
the night in question. Porter argues that Adams’s evidentiary hearing testimony shows 
she had a good recollection of the night in question. However, the PCR court’s 
conclusion to the contrary was not unreasonable since Adams’s testimony shows that, 
other than that Porter picked her up from work at around 10 p.m. and they slept together, 
she did not recall many other details from the time in question.  
Based on trial counsel’s significant experience, he believed that Adams would 
have been a poor witness and that attacking Veal’s identification of Porter would be more 
persuasive to the jury. Such a decision is within the realm of reasonableness and does not 
violate the dictates of Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[A] particular 
decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”); Lewis 
v. Mazurkiewicz, 915 F.2d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (providing that counsel “may properly 
rely on information supplied by the defendant in determining the nature and scope of the 
needed pretrial investigation”). In concluding that trial counsel’s decision not to call 
Adams as an alibi witness was reasonable and not an error “so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” the 
PCR court did not apply the first prong of Strickland in an objectively unreasonable 
manner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Similarly, after having reviewed the record, and in 
light of the significant deference due, we cannot say that the PCR court’s analysis of the 
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first Strickland prong “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. Because Porter fails to meet the first prong 
of Strickland, we need not reach whether Adams’s exclusion also prejudiced Porter. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
B. The PCR court did not unreasonably apply the prejudice prong of Strickland 
in determining that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to 
present the friendship evidence and the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on that evidence  
 
Porter contends that the lack of friendship testimony from Lundy and Adams 
prejudiced him in violation of Strickland and that the district court abused its discretion 
by failing to address his request for an evidentiary hearing thereon.  
A district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing only when the petitioner 
presents a prima facie showing that “a new hearing would have the potential to advance 
the petitioner’s claim.” Siehl v. Grace, 561 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2000)). In other words, the petitioner 
must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of [his trial] would have been different.” Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 110 (3d Cir. 1999)). This is the same 
inquiry used in the prejudice prong of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, if Porter was not 
prejudiced by the exclusion of the friendship testimony because its inclusion could not 
have changed the results of an otherwise fair trial, the district court could not have abused 
its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the same evidence. 
9 
 
Porter claims that trial counsel’s failure to call Lundy and Adams at trial regarding 
the alleged friendship was without justification and that, had counsel produced them, 
Veal’s identification of Porter would have been undermined and there would have been a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome. Thus, Porter claims that he was prejudiced 
by the absence of the friendship evidence and argues that he has made a prima facie 
showing that a new hearing would have the potential to advance his claim.  
Regarding the PCR court’s refusal to permit Lundy to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing on the alleged friendship between Porter and Ashford and limiting Adams’s 
testimony to the alibi evidence, the PCR court ruled that “an evidentiary hearing would 
not be helpful” and that counsel’s decision not to proffer Lundy’s friendship testimony 
“was likely sound trial strategy that would not have changed the outcome of the 
proceedings.” App. 87.  
Even if Lundy and Adams had testified that the friendship existed, any testimony 
regarding how Veal might have reacted to Porter if they were in fact friends is pure 
speculation which would have been inadmissible. Indeed, the PCR court initially 
concluded that the trial court “would not have allowed the testimony because the fact 
they were friends is not probative.” App. 112. Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
specifically found that Porter had not established a prima facie showing that a hearing 
regarding Lundy and the testimony of friendship was warranted, Porter, 80 A.3d at 740, 




 Thus, Porter has failed to establish that the PCR court unreasonably applied the 
prejudice prong of Strickland in determining that trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to investigate and call Lundy and Adams to testify regarding the alleged 
friendship, as this evidence would have been speculative, irrelevant, and inadmissible in 
nature. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (providing that under the prejudice prong, “[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Counsel’s 
failure to present the irrelevant evidence did not deprive Porter of a fair, reliable trial and, 
thus, did not prejudice him under Strickland. Id. at 687. 
Given that the friendship evidence could not have changed the outcome of the 
case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing 
on this evidence since it had no potential to advance Porter’s claims. Siehl, 561 F.3d at 
197.  
Because the PCR court did not apply the prejudice prong of Strickland in an 
objectively unreasonable manner, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on irrelevant information, habeas relief is also 
not warranted on these grounds. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s denial of Porter’s 
Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
